Can Haiti's Police Reforms Be Sustained?

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations                                                                          

Haitian government officials and senior HNP leaders remain committed to creating a professional and effective police force. With ongoing well-targeted and coordinated international assistance, the HNP should be able to continue to strengthen itself as an institution. The police force is clearly more experienced and confident and its capabilities have improved as demonstrated by effective actions during strikes and against gangs in 1997. The force has been fully responsible for domestic security for some time. However, the HNP's ability to stand up to external threats -- crime, anti-democratic provocation and attack, international drug traffickers, and efforts to corrupt or politicize the police -- will depend on building and reinforcing professional standards, solid administrative and disciplinary controls, and consolidating a new code of ethics and way of doing business.

In this report, we have focused on a number of HNP administrative and supervisory weaknesses which have contributed to a serious lag in reducing police misbehavior over the last year. Thus, while we recognize the HNP's need to focus the inspector general's attention on auditing the force and improving the HNP's command and control, we do not believe that this should reduce the already-stretched resources dedicated to investigating reports of human rights violations and other police crimes. The new audits should be evaluated for their impact on incidents of police abuse such as beatings and mistreatment, many of which should be disciplined at the local or regional level. Finally, the IG should issue, as he has recently promised to do, regular, detailed reports of his office's work that would permit the HNP, the Haitian government and non-governmental organizations to accurately assess improvements and identify specific weaknesses in the future.

The IG's investigation and audit work should be complemented by intensive efforts to consolidate communications and reporting procedures through the chain of command to improve ongoing oversight of mid- and upper-level officers in the field who should be (but are not) currently enforcing discipline. Over the longer term, the police should also be considering strategies to address issues of police-community relations and the "chief" mentality. In this regard, we believe that HNP Director General Denizé's lack of interest in community policing is mistaken and that the pilot project in Cap Haïtien should be reinstated and later expanded.

The HNP must also focus training and supervision on the need for HNP agents to follow proper legal procedures when arresting, detaining and interrogating suspects. Most important is the requirement of the police to obtain concrete evidence of criminal activity (rather than relying on rumors or hearsay) before an arrest and to strictly honor the requirement to present detainees to a judge within 48 hours of arrest. This program should begin with the HNP leadership: the director general and the inspector general should not view these protections as hindrances to their work but rather as tools to enforce police discipline and encourage officers to do their work in a professional manner. These protections also help guard against political manipulation of the force.

In the longer term, the sustainability of police reform will depend on the resolution of the current political crisis in Haiti and institutional reform of other ministries and government agencies, particularly the judiciary. A single institution cannot maintain a reform process in isolation within a larger context of institutional paralysis.

While the HNP probably will be able to handle any small demonstrations and disturbances that follow the UN withdrawal, they will also need to rein in Haiti's rising crime rate. Common crime has risen since 1995 and has new characteristics, including heavily armed gangs and attacks against middle-class and wealthy sectors. Attacks against high-profile figures tend to be perceived as political and feed the trend toward the acquisition of armed bodyguards.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Also worrisome is elected officials throughout Haiti creating private security forces or hiring heavily armed bodyguards, some of whom have committed abuses and crimes. Private security firms have boomed and they are not regulated well by the government.

Some level of increased insecurity is probably to be expected now that the United Nations troops have left. HNP Director General Denizé expects the HNP to be put to the test by politically-manipulated demonstrations.⁽⁷⁰⁾ But he also notes the widespread tendency to exaggerate crime problems. While crime has risen over the last few years, it remains low compared with many other Caribbean nations, despite Haiti's extreme poverty and inequity. Other observers agree and believe that the perceptions are driven by increased attacks on wealthier sectors, indicating that relatively small acts of violence can have a major impact on the security environment and the perceived effectiveness of democratic institutions. What is certain is that the HNP will face ongoing challenges, both internal and external to the force, in its efforts to build a police corps that respects the rights of all Haitian citizens. 

69. The shooting death of Deputy Louis Emilio Passe is a recent example. MICIVIH has found no evidence of political motivation, but it has been widely portrayed as such in the Haitian media and by prominent figures. Granderson interview, October 29, 1997.

70. Denizé interview, October 20, 1997.

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