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Can Haiti's Police Reforms Be Sustained?

TR00245A.gif (1685 bytes)VII. The Judicial System and Impunity for Police Killings


The judicial system has made no progress at all in prosecuting cases of police abuse. Although the inspector general has now referred a total of 36 cases to the courts for prosecution,(59) including more than a dozen cases of human rights violations committed between mid-1996 and mid-1997, there has still not been one successful prosecution for a police killing(60) and only some five or six criminal cases for non-deadly police abuse. In fact, judicial impunity for police abuse was aggravated in June 1997, when a judge released six HNP agents accused of participating in summary executions.(61) As of late November, some 65 police agents were in detention for a range of offenses, mostly criminal, according to a survey done by MICIVIH.(62) Only seven are awaiting trial for human rights violations, far fewer than ten months ago.(63) In April 1997, MICIVIH submitted proposals to improve judicial action against police abuse, including draft terms of reference for a special prosecutor for police abuse.(64)

Every analysis of police reform in Haiti has noted the dangers posed by the lack of progress in judicial reform. From the perspective of the HNP, the concern continues that judicial incompetence and corruption, particularly the release of prisoners handed over by police, will lead to frustration and to the police punishing detainees preemptively.

The judicial system remains largely dysfunctional although some small improvements are evident. For example, criminal courts are now holding sessions in most areas although there are many problems with no-show witnesses and jurors. Experts think that there are some competent judicial authorities who could do more if they received institutional support.(65) At the national level, however, the Ministry of Justice is barely functioning and a new commission has worked on judicial reform proposals for over a year now and has yet to adopt a concrete plan of action. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice's own inspectorate unit lacks resources and has barely functioned.

The weakness of police preparation of cases for prosecution is also leading to the acquittal of defendants. HNP agents rarely write reports and frequently have no evidence to give to the judge, including basic details on the detainee. Evidence submitted almost always consists of confessions and eye-witness accounts, never material evidence -- even producing the weapon in cases of killings. Defense lawyers now petition judges to acquit on technical grounds. Poor case preparation forces judges to comply.(66)

Few steps have been taken to institutionalize links between the police and judicial authorities, a problem made painfully evident by the way in which both institutions handled the Leon Jeune case discussed above.(67) International donors are coordinating a training sequence for the judicial police and trying to clarify the division of labor between the police, who initiate the investigation, and the investigating judge, who continues and oversees the investigative process.(68)  


59. Lavagne interview, October 20, 1997.

60. One case of a police killing went to trial. This was a shooting on a bus following an altercation between an off-duty HNP agent and a passenger. The family of the victim claimed that the attack was premeditated and the judge allowed a charge of murder one. The jury did not find adequate evidence of premeditation and acquitted the police agent. The accused agent spent ten months in jail waiting trial and was fired from the police force. Eucher Joseph interview, October 15, 1997, and MICIVIH staff interview, October 15, 1997.

61. Report of the Secretary-General, June 26, 1997. Judge Gilles, who released HNP agents awaiting trial in a human rights case, was later removed from office. Haitian authorities are now trying to recover the case files and re-initiate the prosecution. Granderson interview, October 29, 1997.

62. Information provided to WOLA by MICIVIH, December 11, 1997.

63. MICIVH staff interview, October 15, 1997.

64. Report of the Secretary-General, June 26, 1997, paragraph 11.

65. Granderson interview, October 29, 1997.

66. Ibid.

67. See p 11.

68. "The Transition Mission in Haiti," Report of the Secretary-General, New York, October 31, 1997, UN Document S/1997/832.

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CAN HAITI'S POLICE REFORMS BE SUSTAINED?
  Executive Summary
  1. Police Progress in 1997
  2. Continuing Human Rights Leadership and Management Problems
  3. Conclusion
  4. Recommendations

I - Introduction: The Haitian National Police

  1. Organization of and international support for the new police force
  2. Findings of the January 1997 report

II - Police Progress In 1997

III - Continuing Human Rights Problems

  1. Excessive use of force
  2. HNP disregard of constitutional due process protections
  3. Police arrogance: the "chief" mentality
  4. Police involvement in crime and corruption
  5. Police politicization
  6. Police shortage

IV - HNP Institutional Weakness

  1. Leadership problems and lack of professionalism
  2. Specialized units
  3. Administration and equipment

V - The Inspector General

  1. Attention to police beatings
  2. Reporting on police abuse
  3. Institutional audits
  4. Lack of external complaint mechanisms

VI - Community-Police Relations

VII - The Judicial System and  Impunity for Police Killings

VIII - Conclusions And Recommendations

Acknowledgements

 

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