|
III.
Continuing Human Rights Problems
 a.
Excessive use of force
The most serious HNP human rights abuses in 1997 grew out of the continued excessive use
of force in special police operations and daily patrols and investigations, particularly
unjustified killings and beatings. First, HNP personnel killed some 46 people between
January and October 1997, about half of which appear to have been serious human rights
violations.(7) This brings the total number of
killings by the HNP since their first deployment in June 1995 to at least 92 and possibly
closer to 137,(8) as many as half of which were
not human rights violations. MICIVIH is investigating an additional 18 killings over this
period as possible cases of excessive use of force. Six of the killings were allegedly
extrajudicial executions (although in one case police involvement has not been confirmed
and others have produced conflicting versions of events). The remaining cases are unclear,
either because of a lack of sufficient information to suggest that the police acted
improperly, the circumstances implied that the use of force was legitimate, or the killing
was a common crime by a police officer such as a crime of passion.(9)
Second, while not systematic or routine, beatings and other forms of mistreatment
increased in 1997 after dropping sharply in the second half of 1996. Between January and
the end of October 1997, MICIVIH received more than 250 complaints from individuals who
alleged they had been subjected to some form of ill-treatment. Allegations ranged from a
few slaps to severe beatings, some of them causing visible injuries. A small percentage
occurred during police operations to break up roadblocks or demonstrations. Beatings
sometimes occurred at the moment of arrest, after the person had been handcuffed, or
during interrogation. MICIVIH has raised or is currently raising the majority of these
cases with the police authorities. Many of those who alleged ill-treatment were accused of
belonging to armed gangs and/or of being involved in crimes against the police, such as
killing police agents and stealing police guns.(10)
Third, efforts to reduce the excessive use of force by special police units called upon to
control crowds were mixed. While MICIVIH noted some improvement in the policing of
demonstrations, "police abuses were reported during several protests, some of which
were violent."(11) While precise
responsibility is not clear, it appears that CIMO, the crowd control unit, and GIPNH, the
SWAT unit, may be responsible for two killings in the context of the March 1997 school
strikes in Port-au-Prince. An organization in Grand Goave accused the CIMO of excessive
and unnecessary use of force and tear gas which they blame for the death two days later of
a small child who inhaled the gas.(12) GIPNH and
CIMO members masked their faces during some operations, hindering public identification of
police agents.(13)
A major concern with such deployments of the GIPNH and CIMO units is the fact that they
are equipped with heavy weapons (some HNP stations throughout Haiti also sport these
weapons), including 12-bore shotguns, Uzi's and M-16s,(14)
in contravention of the police law which restricts the HNP to the use of side-arms. The
Haitian parliament is currently considering a law to amend the Police Law to permit
specific units to carry heavy weapons. NCHR has raised concerns that the draft bill fails
to establish clear guidelines for police use of heavy weapons. Parliamentarians share the
concern that the draft language does not define what weapons may be permitted for which
specific police units.(15) These are important
issues, and the amendment needs to delineate clearly and strictly HNP use of heavy
weapons. The Haitian parliament should act promptly to redraft and pass this legislation
to correct the current reality that increasing numbers of HNP, on regular assignments as
well as in specialized units, are illegally equipped with heavy weapons.
top
of page
 b. HNP disregard
of constitutional due process protections
HNP leadership and officers are increasingly skirting Haiti's constitutional procedures
that protect Haitian citizens from arbitrary and illegal police behavior. These due
process protections include requirements that the police obtain warrants from the courts
based upon evidence of plausible criminal activity prior to carrying out arrests; arrests
be carried out between 6am and 6pm except in cases of "flagrant delit"
(in which police can arrest without a warrant those who have been caught committing a
crime); suspects be presented before a judge within 48 hours of arrest with enough
evidence of probable criminal activity to justify holding the suspect for trial; and
detainees be released once a court has decided that there are no grounds to detain.(16)
Police officers are increasingly resorting to vague charges against suspects to fulfill
the requirement of "flagrant delit," a charge in which the only
evidence is the testimony of the officer. HNP personnel frequently fail to take detainees
before a judge within the 48-hour period prescribed by law. Recently, judges have begun to
issue written notes "authorizing" extended periods of detention for the police
to continue with their investigations beyond 48 hours. These "authorizations" do
not comply with Article 26 of the 1987 Constitution requiring judges to rule on the
legality of the arrest within 48 hours. If the judge decides that the arrest is illegal or
that the police have not produced concrete evidence to suggest that the suspect was
involved in a crime, the detainee must be released immediately.
A recent example of several of these problems was the November 16, 1997 arrest of Leon
Jeune, former Secretary of State for Security, in his home on the charge of conspiring
against state security (an alleged plot to kill the president and other leaders). Although
the politically-sensitive operation was planned well in advance and involved the entire
chain of command including the director general, no search or arrest warrant was ever
produced. A judge was apparently rounded up at the last minute to participate in the
operation, but there is no indication the judge issued a formal warrant. The police
appeared to have entered the Jeune house after 6pm and allegedly manhandled Jeune and his
driver, slapping and kicking them, before taking them into custody. After his arrest,
Jeune was never brought before a judge, the police never presented any evidence against
him in a court of law, and two judges ordered him released (one issued a release order
shortly after the arrest).(17) He was finally
released more than three weeks later.
We are concerned about the cavalier attitude of the leadership of the HNP towards the
legal requirements for a valid search, arrest and detention in the Jeune case. These
constitutional guarantees are designed to ensure that arrests are made based on concrete
evidence, not rumors or personal or political considerations, and that adequate
investigation occurs prior to arrests and not solely afterwards. We are not convinced that
the HNP sees the honoring of these legal guarantees as critical tools for the development
of an independent, professional, publicly-respected force free from political influence.
While the judiciary fully shares responsibility for the mishandling of these issues, HNP
leadership must give serious attention to disciplinary measures designed to rectify these
now-evident deficiencies in police procedures.
top
of page
 c. Police arrogance:
the "chief" mentality
Many Haitians of different backgrounds describe HNP personnel as frequently arrogant and
reluctant to mingle or communicate with members of the local community, tending to see
themselves as a privileged caste. While this is an over-generalization, there are
troubling tendencies in the HNP that feed this perception and need to be corrected before
they permeate the institutional culture.
Most HNP personnel are profoundly reluctant to walk the beat and rarely descend from their
vehicles. Broken-down vehicles are repeatedly cited by police as a reason for not being
able to patrol. Some HNP do not appear to have a clear concept of routine patrols, viewing
their task solely as responding to calls.(18)
One explanatory factor is the high education level of the HNP. In a country with 70
percent illiteracy, all HNP agents have the equivalent of a high school diploma. An
international observer noted that: "There is a class problem. The HNP are educated
and urban, what do they have to say to some peasant in the hills?"(19) Many HNP are continuing their studies and
dislike rural postings away from colleges. A major redeployment of the HNP underway during
October was aimed primarily at bringing agents who had served for several years in rural
areas into towns, and sending the roughly one-third of the HNP which has been serving in
Port-au-Prince to the provinces. In response to these issues, in the new round of police
recruitment, the education requirement has been dropped significantly to "troisičme"
(roughly U.S. tenth-grade level).
Another explanation offered by Haitians and international observers is that the HNP may be
falling into the behavior patterns of past Haitian security forces (the old models), a
"chief" mentality characterized by arrogance, unwillingness to work, taking
goods and services without paying for them, and sexually harassing women. These attitudes
are not yet endemic within the force, but such arrogance is profoundly damaging to the
effort to establish a new style of relationship between police and the Haitian population.
top
of page
 d.
Police involvement in crime and corruption
Haitians and international observers are increasingly concerned about police committing
common crime including drug trafficking, general contraband and gang activities. Police
authorities arrested some 20 police officers during November 1997 after seized drugs
vanished from police stations.(20) Many Haitians
raise questions about officers whose living standards appear to far exceed their salaries.
There is considerable anecdotal evidence of minor police corruption, such as seeking free
services, payment for their services, and general "greasing of the wheels."
Inspector General Eucher Joseph says that he is investigating officers suspected of drug
trafficking and has dismissed a significant number of officers on criminal charges as well
as human rights abuse, but the statistics he provided us give no breakdown of the number
of officers fired by the type of infraction.(21)
He stated that between 50 and 60 police officers are now in jail in Port-au-Prince on
corruption charges. Inspector General Eucher Joseph, Director General Denizé, and
Secretary of State for Justice Robert Manuel all state that corruption is one of the most
serious threats to the integrity and professionalization of the HNP.
top
of page
e. Police politicization
A relatively new problem emerging in the HNP is the threat of politicization. While in the
past, certain leadership positions were awarded based on political criteria, Denizé now
poses efforts to politicize the police as a major threat to the professionalization of the
HNP.(22) Haiti's southwest, the department of
the Grande Anse, is noted as one of the most problematic areas, where the HNP departmental
director has ties to a dominant local political group. At this time, it appears that
efforts to co-opt the police are largely taking place at the local and individual level
and there is no single political sector with the capability to launch a nationwide effort
to dominate the HNP. Clearly, this situation could easily deteriorate with changing
political dynamics.
top
of page
f. Police shortage
For its population of 7.2 million, Haiti has a drastic shortage of police officers.(23) As a result, local elected officials and
organizations develop private security corps or hire large numbers of armed bodyguards. In
rural areas lacking a police presence, elected local officials are assuming increasing
powers of arrest and detention. These activities are illegal. In addition, those officials
are reportedly responsible for a number of abuses.(24)
This is viewed by many Haitian observers as a troubling reversion to the practices of the
"section chiefs" -- the military-appointed authorities who ruled rural Haiti
brutally and with total impunity for decades. It reflects the continued weakness of the
state, particularly outside the capital, Port-au-Prince.
7. Information provided to WOLA by MICIVIH, December 11,
1997.
8. These figures are derived from the 46 killings established
in "The Human Rights Record of the Haitian National Police," jointly published
in January 1997 by WOLA, NCHR and Human Rights Watch/Americas, and the HNP's further 29
killings during 1997. A recent press article stated that between July 1995 and July 1997,
HNP personnel were responsible for 114 killings in total. The HNP has killed at least nine
people since July 1997, bringing the total to 123 in mid-November 1997. See Serge
Kovaleski, "Haitians Find New Police Too Similar to Old," The Washington
Post, July 14, 1997.
9. Information provided to WOLA by MICIVIH, December 11,
1997.
10. Ibid.
11. "The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in
Haiti," Report of the Secretary-General, New York, June 26, 1997, UN Document
A/51/935, paragraph 9. Hereafter Report of the Secretary-General, June 26, 1997.
12. Interview with members of Comme il Faut, Grand
Goave, October 17, 1997.
13. Report of the Secretary-General, June 26, 1997,
paragraph 9.
14. HNP stations have heavy weapons, but they do not always
have bullets. In Cité Soleil, HNP had at least eight heavy weapons, but only three clips
with bullets. Visit to Cité Soleil police station, October 19, 1997.
15. See NCHR May 13, 1997 letter to Haitian
parliamentarians, on file at the NCHR and WOLA. Interview with Senators Laguerre and
Madistin, Port-au-Prince, October 28, 1997.
16. Article 26, 1987 Constitution of Haiti.
17. Telephone interviews with MICIVIH staff and a U.S.
journalist working in Haiti, December 11, 1997. A press report alleged that the police
commissaire Aramic Louis repeatedly beat Jeune. See "U.S.-trained Haitian police
accused of harassment," The Dallas Morning News, November 24, 1997.
Interviews with Eucher Joseph, December 15, 1997 and Pierre Denizé, December 18, 1997.
18. When asked if and how often they patrolled, police in
Cité Soleil replied that they patrolled several times a day, every time they had to
respond to people coming and asking for help. Interview, October 19, 1997.
19. Laparra interview, October 16, 1997.
20. Nicole Volpe, "As UN forces head home, Haiti faces
high hurdles," Reuters, November 28, 1997.
21. Eucher Joseph interview, October 15, 1997.
22. Interview with Pierre Denizé, HNP Director General,
Port-au-Prince, October 20, 1997.
23. At the time of this report's publication, Haiti has
approximately 6,000 police officers. New York City, with a population similar to Haiti's,
and with a much smaller geographic area, has 30,000 police. The Guatemalan government has
a target of a 20,000-strong police for its population of 11 million.
24. Report of the Secretary-General, June 16, 1997,
paragraph 9.
top
of page
 return to
previous page
 continue onto next page
|
