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Human Rights: Spotlight on Haiti's
Political Crisis
The following is a sign-on letter that is being circulated
in and outside of Haiti, by the authors of "Where Law Ends,
Tyranny Begins."
Why we oppose the dissolution of Haitis
democratic institutions
General Considerations:
"Dont go from bad to worse."
- This has nothing to do with a position in favor of the Parliamentarians or others
elected in the 1995 elections ¾ to whom we attribute totally
mediocre performances, despite the great merit of certain individuals and the good faith
of a few others. Rather, this has to do with expressing our firm conviction that the
situation can only be worse with a government without controls. (It has been reported that
during the seven months between the end of the 45th legislature and the
entrance of the [current] 46th, the Aristide government is alleged to have
accumulated a budgetary deficit of 1.2 billions of gourdes [close to that accumulated
during the three years of the coup détat!]).
- The Parliament must be maintained in conformity with Constitutional prescriptions and
honest elections must be organized as quickly as possible so as to allow a new legislature
capable of meeting its responsibilities.
Constitutional Considerations:
"Laws cannot be permitted to violate the Constitution."
- It is the Constitution and not electoral laws [or decrees] which specifies term lengths
for elected officials.
- The Constitution does not give the President the right to dissolve the Parliament, even
if it is considered dysfunctional. It gives him the obligation to remedy the situation,
that is to say, to assure its sound functioning.
- Neither does the Constitution give the Executive the right to dissolve the Municipal
Councils. The Departmental Council has that exclusive right, in the case of negligence,
fraudulent administration or embezzlement, legally declared by the appropriate Court. The
problem is that the Decree of the 21st of January 1997 declaring the
termination of mandates for those elected in June 1995 should apply equally to those
elected in April 1997 including the aforementioned Departmental Councils -- under a
similar provision of the Electoral Decree of that year. The Executive cannot insist on the
termination of mandates for the Deputies and the Mayors and not also for the Local
Assemblies and all other bodies derived from them.
- The 1987 Constitution does not give the Executive the capacity to govern by decree. No
article in the Constitution allows this. Only the National Council of Government was given
the right to do so, and only prior to the establishment of Parliament. A government
without Parliament therefore has no legislative mechanisms, which is to say it cannot
operate except arbitrarily.
- There can be no legal government without Parliaments ratification of the general
policy of the Prime Minister. There can be no legal government without a countervailing
Parliamentarian authority. The authority of the Cour Supérieure des Comptes et
Contentieux Administratif [Supreme Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes] is only
administrative and cannot substitute for the authority of Parliament.
- The Constitution does not give the government the right to create its own countervailing
power in a system of checks and balances.
- It is imperative that the budgetary laws be ratified by Parliament. The Constitution is
clear on this subject: "In this respect, the proposed laws must be voted first by the
Chamber of Deputies."
Economic Considerations:
"We stand to lose everything in this dangerous game."
- An enduring economic crisis has already caused irreparable damage to the countrys
economy. Many voices in the business sector, both national and foreign, have made it quite
clearl that this kind of political climate does not foster investment. The closing of
Parliament will block international assistance. The Interamerican Bank of Development
(IDB) has clearly said so. Everyone expects that the American administration and European
Economic Community will adopt the same policy. The country risks an economic situation
similar to that during the last coup détat (September 1991-October 1994).
- The multiplication of conflicts between small groups associated with those currently in
power, on the one hand, and the partisans of elected officials whose terms are being
shortened, on the other, has already begun to disturb public order, literally setting the
nation ablaze, with the attendant risks of reducing even further this years
agricultural production, already severely damaged by Hurricane Georges.
- The resumption of dechoukaj-type operations in such a socially explosive context
could constitute a grave risk to private capital and employment. No one is safe!
Political Considerations:
"No one should profit from their own mistakes."
- It is the Constitution, and not the electoral laws which fix the term limits of elected
officials. The 1995 Electoral Decree is the result of a political agreement between the
Executive and the candidates at the time, for the [sole] purpose of respecting the 46th
legislatures termination date on the second Monday of January 1999, as set by the
Constitution. From this perspective, that compromise was also clearly based on the
presumption that elections would be held [on time, also in accordance with the
Constitutional "clock"] in November 1998. The fact that the Executive did not
organize these elections negates the rationale for this initial [1995] agreement. It is
therefore necessary to arrive at another political agreement. No one should profit from
their own mistakes.
- The use of violence by popular organizations, patently manipulated ¾
no matter to what end ¾ is unacceptable. The fact that the
Executive justifies its decision against the Parliament and the Municipal Councils by
these violent and reprehensible actions is even more insupportable. It is impossible to
foresee valid elections in such a climate.
- We see it as self-evident that the Executive intends to control the next elections by
naming Municipal Commissions directly under its control to replace duly-elected Municipal
Councils [responsible to their electorates], which is also the clear intent of maintaining
certain other local governmental institutions [the local assemblies], [whose legitimacy
is] already contested, but which [should] fall equally under the Council of
Ministers Resolution of January 20, 1999.
We launch, therefore, an appeal to reason, to dialogue and to
negotiation while there is still time.
Follows the signatures
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