Our country has been in a crisis for the past 18 months. This situation can be described as an "electoral crisis," first of all; next, as a "governmental crisis"; further, as a "parliamentary crisis"; and, lastly, as a "local governance crisis" (in terms of Municipal [Mayoral] and Communal Section Administrative Councils [CASECs]). These are the most apparent and preoccupying issues. However, the political crisis is profoundly deeper than many political actors and most citizens may realize.

The present impasse is the result of a combination of background factors that we will discuss at the end of this document. A fundamental factor has been the pursuit of a course of action that has progressively eliminated or blocked the functioning of all institutions not under presidential control. This process has produced various "vacancies" or "absences" with respect to a number of institutions whose existence is mandated under the 1987 Constitution:

• The absence of a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), as a result of the CEP’s self-destruction after halting the April 6, 1997 electoral process, and the Executive’s lack of initiative to constitute another;
• The absence of a legal and legitimate government, after Rosny Smarth’s resignation as Prime Minister, as well as the resignation of 7 of his government’s 15 ministers (the Constitution stipulates a quorum of ten Ministers [for the ministerial cabinet, or "Council of Ministers"]);
• The absence of a Conciliation Commission, whose creation has been left hanging since the 1987 Constitution’s passage.
• To this must be added the current attempt to dissolve Parliament and the Municipal and Communal Section Administrative Councils.

These deficiencies have resulted in an extremely dangerous, and deeply troubling, institutional vacuum that threatens the democratization process in Haiti. At the same time, they can not be wholly attributed to the Presidency, because all of the political parties and factions that are represented in Parliament must also share responsibility for the deterioration of the situation.

In addition to an inclination towards absolute control of the State apparatus, other elements characteristic of the attitude of those in power are equally noteworthy and troubling, including:

• A certain contempt for the Constitution and its laws, and sometimes a very partisan approach to interpreting its prescriptions;
• An unwillingness to appeal to dialogue and negotiation as means to resolve differences and conflicts;

These characteristics can be identified over the whole course of the development of the ongoing crisis, which has brought us to the current impasse.

The present conflict between the Executive Branch and different categories of elected officials (Parliamentarians, Mayors, and Members of Communal Section Administrative Councils [CASECs]), would appear to revolve around a dispute concerning the applicability of certain provisions of two legal documents in the face of countermanding Constitutional prescriptions. The 1995 Electoral "Law," which convoked the 1995 balloting for the election of [one third of the Senate], Deputies, Mayors and CASECs, shortened these elected officials’ terms by almost a year, in order to bring things back into line with the electoral calendar stipulated in the Constitution[, which had been disrupted as a result of the 1991 coup d’état]. This compromise seemed necessary due to the delay in scheduling these legislative and local elections, that should have been held in November, 1994, but would not actually take place until November, 1995. Thus, this "law" also clearly foresaw the organization of subsequent elections [for these same posts], by November 1998.

The decree legislating the 1997 local elections

Following the same logic, the decree taken by the President in January, 1997, for the election of the members of the Territorial Assemblies at the Communal Section, Municipal and Departmental levels, and the Departmental and Interdepartmental Councils, similarly shortened these elected officials’ terms of office by more than two years, in order to comply with the same, constitutionally mandated, electoral calendar. Hence, all these elected officials’ terms were also supposed to end on Monday, January 11, 1999.

The reasoning underlying these provisions

Those who enacted these exceptional dispositions had thus taken the liberty of reducing the various term of office in question – by one or two years – in order to respect the Constitution’s formal requirements regarding the scheduling of various elections. This was done [and accepted] in the firm expectation that future elections would subsequently be held on time. The 1995 Electoral "Law" and the 1997 Decree, then, were special measures taken for a very specific purpose: To correct the electoral calendar so that it would henceforth comply with the Constitution’s prescriptions, assuming that the next elections would be held in November, 1998.

The disputed April 6, 1997 elections

The local and legislative elections of April 6, 1997 could not be completed [by second-round balloting]. The results were widely disputed. Moreover, the results were not published according to the accepted procedure, insofar as their publication was not authorized by then-Prime Minister, Rosny Smarth. In the event, Mr. Smarth preferred to resign, rather than to endorse the results of what he considered to have been grossly fraudulent elections.

The failure to hold elections in November 1998

The legislative and local elections that should have been held in November, 1998 did not take place. As a result, the explicit purpose of the 1995 and 1997 electoral decrees, which was to adjust the terms [of those elected in them in order to return] to the Constitutional calendar, was compromised.

The institutional vacuum should have been avoided

Faced with this situation, the logical thing to do to avoid an institutional vacuum would have been to repeal the pertinent provisions of these two decrees, and restore the abridged terms of office to their full measure. Such a step would have been in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution because the terms, even once extended, would still have been within the four years prescribed. Meanwhile, negotiations for the creation of an Electoral Council should have been accelerated, so that elections could have taken place before the new expiration dates. [Instead,] the President’s consultations on the formation of a Provisional Electoral Council – talks that appeared to be eliciting a broad consensus within the political class and civil society – were suspended.

Some crucial questions:

Article 136 of the Constitution states that:

"The President of the Republic is the Chief of State; [his mission is] to ensure that the Constitution is respected and followed, and that [its] institutions remain stable. He guarantees the normal functioning of public powers, and ensures the perennity of the State."

Executive responsibilities

Faced with the objections raised by the April 6, 1997 elections, the President created a [Special] Commission that was charged with investigating them. Their report was submitted to the Head of State, who has neither made the findings public nor taken any actions based on these findings. What was the purpose of this report, paid for by the Haitian taxpayer? Did it contain truths that embarrassed him? Can it not be considered an obstruction of justice, or at least of the truth, to have not rendered the findings public? Perhaps the publication of the results of this investigation would have allowed a decision to be made about the April 6, 1997 elections, and resolved the impasse.

When the President realized it would be impossible to organize elections in November, 1998, why did he not publicly call upon all political parties and factions present in Parliament to face their responsibilities in order to avoid an institutional void? Why did he choose, instead, to sustain the pretense that a compromise with his political adversaries [based on confidential, rather than public, negotiations] was at hand?

Up until the last moment, the President’s intentions were rather ambiguous. On January 11, 1999, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had invited the entire diplomatic corps to the [regularly scheduled] opening session of Parliament. The National Assembly [i.e., both houses of Parliament] was present, as well as all the invited guests, including Haitian dignitaries and foreign diplomats alike. Without any explanation whatsoever, the President did not make his [expected] appearance, and failed to fulfill his constitutional obligation to present his State of the Nation address to the National Assembly. Late that same evening, in casual attire, he came before the Nation[, in a televised address,] to declare Parliament to be null and void.

It is easy to understand, then, why certain political analysts are asking whether all of the President’s actions [to that point] had not been designed precisely to achieve this result: disposing of a Legislature that had opposed his government.

The responsibilities of the political groups and factions represented in Parliament

The political parties and factions represented in Parliament also share responsibility in the deterioration and worsening of the crisis. They demonstrated little competence in democratic matters because, over a period of 17 months, none of the different groups present was able to find a compromise and constitute an [effective] majority, to render Parliament operational. Yet, the art of politics resides precisely in the skills of negotiation and compromise.

All too often did it appear as though only partisan politics in the struggle for power were important. Both houses’ performance was rather weak when it came to legislating and to ratifying contracts. Funds that should have been allocated for public investment in infrastructure or in social programs were lost.

The absence of transparency

The political parties and factions represented in Parliament showed no desire to be transparent in their negotiations with the President. The Haitian people were not really able to follow the negotiations as they evolved. There were no written reports, no joint statements. Yet these negotiations were of supreme interest for the Nation.

They were unable, and apparently unwilling, to mobilize public opinion in the struggle to save its institutions.

Unfortunately, presidential and even totalitarian reflexes are still very much alive in our society. During two centuries of national history (as the historian Claude Moïse has demonstrated in his history of the Haitian Parliament, in a study pertaining to the 46^th legislature), the Executive has always attempted to subjugate the Legislative Branch; or, to remove parliamentarians who are too independent. Today we are living a new episode of this tragic history.

This can only prove to be disastrous, especially at the political level – but also on the economic and social fronts. Indeed, in the 7 months [sic] that President Aristide was governing without the presence of Parliament ([between the] end of the 45^th and the beginning of the 46^th Legislatures [5 February – 15 October 1995]), the national deficit reached the record level of 1.2 billion gourdes [ca. US $75 million] – close to that accumulated during the entire three-year coup period!

Local authorities put under supervision

It is important to point out that what is at stake today is not only parliamentary power, but also the power of local elected officials: Mayors, the Administrative Councils of Communal Sections (CASECs), etc. Here again, the Executive wants to control everything. He would like to dismiss the elected Municipal Councils [three-person mayoral cartels, presiding over each of Haiti’s 133 communes], and replace them with "Commissions" that he himself would nominate.

The Executive Branch is already represented by one Delegate per Department [9], and one Vice-Delegate per District [41]. The new measures announced in January, 1999 call for the illegal nomination of 399 "municipal commissioners" (who would replace the Mayors), and 1,695 "administrative agents" (to replace the CASECs), with allegiance only to the [central] powers that be. The national territory would then be entirely under the singular control of the Executive.

To these loyal representatives [of the Executive] must be added: the 9 members of the Interdepartmental Council, 9 Departmental Councils [and Assemblies], 133 Municipal Assemblies, and 565 Communal Section Assemblies, all of which derive from the disputed April 6, 1997 elections, and [the majority of whose members] are obviously devoted to the President’s party. This impressive network would permit complete coverage, and on-the-ground control of the electoral process. The political forces close to the President would thus completely dominate the political landscape, the mechanisms of power – with no possible contest. Finally, the creation of a Communal Section Police Force might well be expected to complete the design. Considerably less was required for Duvalier to establish a thirty-year dictatorship.

The way seems to be well paved for all sorts of misadventures; and Haiti seems ready to descend into an endless spiral of crises within crises.

In the short-term, that means an interruption of the democratic process that was reestablished in October, 1994, based on the return to constitutional order as a result of the intervention of a multinational force, led by the U.S. Army and mandated by the United Nations.

An immediate practical effect, due to the absence of a Parliament, will be the Executive’s inability, among other things, to:

• Establish a legitimate new Prime Minister [and Government];
• Ratify international agreements;
• Have the national budget approved;
• Introduce amendments to the Constitution according to the [constitutionally mandated schedule], some of which are of capital importance;
• Prevent another massive exodus of economic and political refugees towards the Dominican Republic and the United States; and,
• Create the climate of confidence that is a prerequisite for the organization of honest and credible elections.

Medium and long-term consequences

Moreover, the underlying effects of this never-ending political crisis are having profound, negative ramifications throughout Haitian society. For while our society is undergoing a critical metamorphosis, its fundaments are being shaken by rampant urbanization and the social destabilization that has accompanied the growth of a drug sub-culture. To which must be added the process of globalization of our economy and our politics, and the increasing impact of decisions made elsewhere on our national circumstances – a process that started in the early 1970’s.

Four principal aspects of this ongoing deterioration merit mention here:

1. the collapse of the State;
2. the disintegration of society, to an extent that threatens the very notion of social life itself;
3. the liquidation of our basic institutions, along with positive traditional values; and,
4. the decapitalization of the Haitian economy and its productive apparatus.

The economic and social implications of political instability

Haitian entrepreneurs are once more being held hostage to political conflicts. Public decisions that should reinforce investment are lagging behind, due to a lack of consensus. In the light of this basic dysfunctionality in the public sector, [the current] institutional vacuum can only further jeopardize Haiti’s credibility when it comes to the investment climate and our reputation for negotiating and respecting agreements – both indispensable conditions in today’s business world. Moreover, any extension or aggravation of the current political instability will further poison an environment already unfavorable as a result of inappropriate economic policies.

Certain of these policies deserve to be emphasized:

• Realizing that the Lavalas regime, in addition to [tolerating] contraband [trade], has opened Haitian agriculture to competition from imported produce and staple products such as rice and beans, as a result of the quasi-elimination of custom taxes, agricultural producers are concerned that they have to work in an unstable political climate;
• As a consequence of this "liberalization" [of the economy], and in the absence of a rational national economic policy, both peasant and industrial agricultural producers are threatened with failure if effective measures to modernize the sector are not put in place. Any prolonged period of economic instability can only accelerate the [ongoing] impoverishment [and continued decapitalization] of the rural economy.
• In this context, the investments necessary to modernize the agricultural sector can no longer be held hostage to political uncertainty. [Recently,] Dominican poultry producers announced a surplus of 2 million chickens. Everywhere in the CARICOM region, agricultural entrepreneurs are actively preparing for their integration [in the international economy].
• The current freeze on more than US$ 200 million in multilateral assistance, [from such sources as] the Interamerican Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund of the World Bank, affects all social sectors, including health, education and basic hygiene (drinking water, etc.). Together with the continued delay in the modernization of the State, [this situation] constitutes a serious obstruction to economic development and only highlights the urgent need for negotiations [to resolve the current crisis].
• The close to 2 million unemployed and underemployed, whose number has not diminished in more than a decade, can no longer wait for national and international investment, interminably delayed by political and institutional instability.
• The tentative revival of the light industrial sector since 1997 will also be compromised if political uncertainty increases.
• Any prolongation of the long-standing political crisis will [also] affect education, and will result in an under-trained and ill-equipped labor force, poorly suited to the turn-of-the-century economic environment, in which [skilled] labor is a fundamental factor in competitiveness [on the world market].

Three conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis.

1. There is an urgent need for a new political compromise.

From a legal perspective, the Nation must reconcile two conflicting dictates.

• On one hand, the absolutely fundamental requirement to maintain the balance of powers within the State.
• On the other, the pre-existing agreement to shorten the terms of office of some elected officials in order to return to the [constitutionally mandated] electoral calendar.

If the Legislative and Executive Branches are willing to negotiate with each other, together they can find a political compromise, an arrangement that will permit legality to prevail. The resources of the Judicial Branch, and of [Haitian] civil society, can be brought to bear to facilitate the negotiation of this compromise.

1. A democratic culture, based on respect for the "rules of the game," must be promoted.

The system of government mandated by the 1987 Constitution requires a truly democratic culture – one characterized principally by an openness to others[’ points of view], by a propensity to dialogue and compromise, by a disposition to share power, by an acceptance of the limits [to be placed on the exercise of power], and by respect for both the law and one’s word – in order to function properly. Yet in our society, political life is more aptly characterized by mistrust, aggressive hyperbole, confrontation, the quest for absolute power, the rejection of all limits, and a taste for dissimulation and treachery.

[In this sense,] all of today’s political actors bear some measure of personal responsibility for the current crisis. Yet even in the face of such a circumstance, a change in political system – a return to an authoritarian or dictatorial regime – is simply out of the question. The Haitian people aspire to democracy; the modern world demands it. We must therefore change how we practice politics, and all parties must be willing to join in the effort to effect such a change.

It would be both sterile and self-destructive to plunge ourselves into another period of violent confrontation, only a few years after the coup d’état and the [international economic] embargo that was its consequence. It would [also] not be desirable to call, once again, for foreign intervention. [Rather,] it is possible to find a negotiated solution to the crisis, if all parties agree to come to the table with a minimum of good will, intelligence and patriotism.

2. The country faces a critical choice: Dictatorship, or Democracy?

We would like to commend the various sectors that have taken a stand in the present situation. We can only hope that it will be the beginning of a collective commitment to building, together, that State of Law to which all citizens aspire. We take heart in the collaborative effort of business and labor to take mediatory actions. Civic and religious groups, grassroots organizations, and political parties must also continue their efforts to inform and mobilize public opinion. Precisely because of its gravity, the current crisis represents a real opportunity to initiate this public dialogue.

It falls to civil society to keep the pressure on politicians. Otherwise, they will continue to be drawn into petty quarrels and to neglect the urgent issues facing our polity. Our history has been marked by the absence of both a sense of duty and a spirit of generosity among those who, in the name of the People, exercise power. Haiti’s sad chronicle demonstrates all too clearly that: "Where law ends, tyranny begins."

ALEXANDRE, Guy – former Haitian Ambassador to the Dominican Republic

BAJEUX, Jean-Claude – Human Rights

DESROCHES, Rosny – Educator and Methodist Lay Leader

GAILLARD, Micha – Human Rights

LAFONTANT JOSEPH, André – Unionist

LHERISSON, Jean – Human Rights

PHAREL, Kesner – Economist and Journalist