1999 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Released March 1, 2000

See also:
NCHR Calls for Election Delay Again
Country Report on Human Rights Practices in 1999

HAITI

I. Summary

Haiti is a major transshipment point for drugs, primarily cocaine, moving from South America to the United States. Haiti's weak democratic institutions, fledgling police force, and eroding infrastructure provide South America-based narcotics traffickers with a path of very little resistance. Haiti is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Haiti achieved some anti-drug progress in 1999. The Government of Haiti (GOH) and the USG collaborated in targeting the principal Colombian drug trafficking organization operating in Haiti-the Coneo family-and arrested two of its key members. The GOH deployed its Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC). The GOH continued to implement the proposed GOH/USG Maritime Counternarcotics Interdiction Agreement. It officially agreed to expel non-Haitians fugitives wanted by the U.S. Justice Department. The GOH cooperated with the Dominican Republic in planning for a Haitian border control unit and police exchange program.

Prime Minister Alexis approved the concept of the 1997 draft CN master plan as well as the creation of a National Drug Council that the draft plan called for. He assigned a special judiciary team to update counternarcotics draft legislation for parliament's earliest approval. The Prime Minister also called for formation of a special anti-corruption commission.

Several important counternarcotics goals, however, remained unfulfilled. While the estimated flow of cocaine to Haiti increased slightly during 1999, the GOH seized less than a third of the amount of cocaine it did in 1998. The HNP deployed none of the twenty-five new officers it had pledged for its counternarcotics unit (the BLTS) for 1999. The GOH failed to draft a much-needed Memorandum of Understanding on Interagency Cooperation. It allowed Haitian Customs and Immigration to spurn CN cooperation with the HNP at ports and airports and to withdraw from participation with the HNP in the JICC. With only two exceptions, mere dismissal-rather than arrest and prosecution-continued to be the standard punishment for narcotics corruption among police. The GOH failed to produce a promised report on 1998's notorious "450 kilo affair." The judicial system continued to move slowly, and while numerous drug cases were handed to the system for investigation, there were no drug convictions in 1999. The GOH also took no steps to join the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force.

In September, a ministerial-level bilateral meeting with the Dominican Republic resulted in the creation of a thirteen-part agreement to increase counternarcotics cooperation between the two nations. The GODR approved the accords at the highest levels and stands ready to carry them out, but precipitous personnel changes in the Haitian Government have put at risk further progress.

II. Status of Country

Because parliament has not functioned since 1997, the GOH has been unable to pass key counternarcotics bills. Thus Haitian authorities continued to be deprived of long-needed criminal laws and law enforcement tools. Those authorities continue to suffer from inexperience, lack of resources, a crumbling infrastructure, and an antiquated legal system. The police to population ratio is one of the lowest in the world, and the nation's counternarcotics police unit (BLTS), which serves a population of eight million, numbers only twenty-four. Haiti's poverty, the worst in the hemisphere, makes it exceptionally vulnerable to official narcotics corruption. As a result, Haiti increasingly serves as an important transit point and repository for large cocaine shipments en route from South America to the United States. Both USG and GOH authorities recognize the unmistakable signs of money laundering activities, which Haitian law has not yet criminalized.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1999

Policy Initiatives. Because of the continuing political impasse, the critical anti-drug policy initiatives begun in 1997 by the GOH continued to be on hold throughout 1999. These included adoption of an anti-drug National Master Plan and enactment of money laundering/asset forfeiture/chemical control laws. Some policy initiatives were undertaken, however. The Prime Minister approved the concept of a National Drug Council (NDC), and a decree by the Inter-Ministerial Council establishing the NDC is expected in early 2000. The NDC will likely modify an existing CICAD-approved CN master plan written in 1997 by Groupe Magloire (a panel headed by Special Judicial Advisor Rene Magloire). The Prime Minister ordered a special judicial review committee to ready new legislation, including anti-drug and anti-corruption bills, for presentation to the new parliament once it is seated, in early summer of 2000 at the earliest.

With backing from UNDCP, Rene Magloire organized a two-day seminar for discussion and clarification of the drug problem in Haiti in May of 1999. Members of both the private and public sectors met to debate the problem and seek solutions. The discussions resulted in the formulation of several recommendations in the areas of demand reduction, law enforcement, and national coordination. Groupe Magloire published a review of the seminar and its recommendations in December of 1999 for the review of both the GOH and UNDCP.

In its strategic plan to secure free and fair elections, the HNP leadership recognized the importance of urgent measures to fortify against the likely increase in drug trafficking during the pre-election period. Indeed the HNP made counternarcotics one of its five election related priorities. Under the plan, the HNP requested international donor assistance in the areas of equipment, training, and infrastructure, particularly for police stations along the south coast. By the end of 1999, three stations had been rehabilitated and two had been newly constructed.

In September of 1999, the Minister of Justice and the HNP leadership initiated a regional meeting with their Dominican counterparts. The meeting resulted in the creation of a thirteen-point agreement to increase counternarcotics coordination between the two neighboring nations. The GOH plans to implement several of the points, such as counternarcotics personnel exchange and increased communication between border control units, in the year 2000. However, implementation may be hampered by the October 1999 resignation of the GOH Public Security Secretary, a prime mover in GOH/GODR anti-drug collaboration.

Illicit Cultivation and Production. Haiti is not a major drug cultivating or drug producing country. The cultivation, production, distribution, sale and possession of narcotics are illegal in Haiti.

Drug Flow and Transit. USG estimates indicated that some 67 metric tons of cocaine moved through Haiti during 1999, a 24 percent increase over the 1998 USG estimate of 54 metric tons. USG estimates also indicated that nearly 14 percent of the cocaine moving from South America toward the United States passed through Haiti in 1999, compared to 10 percent in 1998.

During 1999, Colombian traffickers shifted somewhat from their 1998 pattern, which directed "go-fast" boats to the unprotected south coast of Haiti. Maritime movement relied increasingly on nondescript fishing vessels and targeted nearly every port of entry, principally Port au Prince, Cap Haitien and Jacmel.

In 1999, airdrops constituted over a third of the estimated flow into Haiti, whose highway system is in shambles and whose mountainous terrain provides nearly undetectable drop and landing sites. While the USG was able to track suspicious aircraft bound for Haiti, GOH law enforcement teams were usually unable to respond.

When cocaine enters Haiti it is often transferred overland to the Dominican Republic from whence it either goes directly to the U.S. mainland or Europe, or via small vessels to Puerto Rico. Once there, the cocaine is shipped via container cargo vessels or commercial airliners to the U.S. or Europe. Cocaine is also smuggled out of Haiti directly to the Continental United States in containerized cargo or on bulk cargo freighters.

Money Laundering/Asset Seizure. Because the GOH has no laws against money laundering nor any cross-border currency transfer declaration requirements, Colombian traffickers have moved cash freely through Haiti without threat of loss. In prior years and in the first half of 1999, the GOH almost invariably returned seized cash to its bearer. During the second half of 1999, however, the GOH manipulated existing laws to retain a substantial percentage of its cash seizures. The BLTS dramatically increased cash seizures in 1999 to approximately USD 3,600,000 from just under USD 1,000,000 in 1998. The BLTS also seized one house worth approximately USD 2,000,000 as well as several vehicles valued at $160,000 during 1999 cocaine seizures and investigations.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. The GOH does not operate a demand reduction or public awareness program. The Association for Alcohol Prevention and Chemical Dependency (APAAC), a private non-governmental organization, remains the only establishment with treatment programs for substance abuse. All anecdotal reports indicate that local consumption continues to increase as traffickers increasingly pay off their personnel in kind.

The UNDCP plans to carry out a survey in 2000 in conjunction with APAAC and, based on its results, the National Drug Council will contact educators to press for demand reduction programs in the schools.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The focus of the GOH anti-drug law enforcement efforts is on the prevention of transport and distribution of illegal drugs. GOH and occasional private sector concern over the destructive potential of trafficking through Haiti is on the rise. Counternarcotics efforts are less a priority than the more pressing matters of social order and personal protection.

During 1999, the HNP seized 430 kilos of cocaine, less than one-third the amount of 1998. This decline in seizures may be due in part to a shift by Colombian traffickers from maritime drug shipments to airdrops. The latter are effectively beyond the reach of Haitian law enforcement units.

The HNP made 72 drug-related arrests in 1999. Four of those arrested were Colombian members of the Coneo drug trafficking organization-two considered major traffickers and two minor members of that organization. Two arrestees were HNP officers. Of the 72, 61 were Haitian, four Colombian, two Dominican Republicans, two Syrian, one American, one Guatemalan, and one Guyanese. Of the 72 arrested in 1999, 62 are in prison at various stages of prosecution, none near actual trial, and six were released. The GOH expelled the four Colombians, who could not be prosecuted under existing Haitian law: one key Coneo member (the wife of the organization's kingpin) was expelled to the Dominican Republic where she faces passport fraud charges, and the other key member (a brother of the kingpin) was expelled to Colombia; one minor Coneo member (another brother of the Coneo kingpin) was expelled to the Dominican Republic (and subsequently to Colombia by the GODR) and the other Coneo henchman to Colombia.

During 1999, the Haitian Coast Guard (HCG), maritime arm of the HNP, seized 43 kilos of cocaine. During 1999 the HCG achieved its first seizure ever made without USCG assistance. The HCG recovered two "go-fast" boats on the south coast. HCG and USCG personnel joined in four dockside boardings that yielded positive evidence of smuggling. 1999 saw a significant increase in HCG boardings of local traffic inside the claw of Haiti. HCG personnel continue to participate in the shiprider program that allows for numerous USCG boardings within Haitian waters. The HCG also participated in a Caribbean-wide training operation.

HNP leadership repeatedly exhibited cooperation with U.S. authorities in counternarcotics efforts in 1999. In February, the HNP worked closely with DEA to successfully disrupt the Coneo organization's trafficking operation in Haiti. It also collaborated with U.S. authorities in two 1999 operations that combined assets from the USCG, DEA, and U.S. Customs and the GOH. The noticeable temporary decrease in airdrop and "go-fast" activity together with reports from in-country informants proved both operations to be major deterrents to smugglers. The GOH also collaborated with the USG in the federal prosecution of a U.S. airline flight attendant accused of transporting 10 kilos of cocaine from Port au Prince to Miami.

GOH law enforcement officials supported 1999 U.S. efforts to establish a Joint Information Coordination Center (JICC) in the Port au Prince International Airport. The HNP provided three well-trained intelligence analysts to the JICC staff, although Haitian Customs and Immigration did not carry out their commitments participate in the JICC. Following INL-sponsored training, the JICC began operations in October. It directly contributed to at least one late 1999 arrest and cash seizure in the Dominican Republic.

The HNP did not carry out its pledge to deploy twenty-five additional BLTS officers in 1999. However, it did identify ten officers to be assigned and deployed in 2000. The HNP leadership and the Prime Minister agreed to provide an additional forty officers following parliamentary elections set for March 2000. They also sanctioned bi-weekly coordination meetings of the HCG and BLTS with their U.S. Embassy counterparts to combat airdrops and maritime smuggling.

Despite some signs of progress, GOH law enforcement entities continue to suffer from inexperience, an outdated legal system, and lack of interagency coordination. The Haitian Customs force, while responsible for several airport drug seizures in 1999, continues to deny the BLTS complete access to the Port Au Prince airport. In November, the Prime Minister ordered the heads of HNP, Customs, Immigration, and the Foreign Ministry to meet to discuss increased cooperation among GOH law enforcement agencies in both the airport and other interagency endeavors throughout Haiti, but there have been no concrete results.

Corruption. Corruption continues to spread throughout the GOH, despite continuing official iterations that it must not be tolerated. The Prime Minister, in his May 1999 list of aspirations for the GOH, called for a special anti-corruption commission which will address, among other matters, money laundering. The Commission will reportedly be officially announced in January of 2000. Also, in late 1999 the Prime Minister issued a directive that all bank directors must inform both the Central Bank and the Ministry of Justice of any large financial transactions.

The HNP Inspector General's office issued no statistics in 1999 on police implication in the drug trade. With two exceptions in 1999, police arrested for drug trafficking were only dismissed from the force without being prosecuted. The GOH did not resolve the "450 kilo affair," the alleged 1998 theft by policemen of a large cocaine shipment (in which high-level HNP involvement had been publicly rumored), and it failed to publish a promised public report on the case. Despite release orders by the investigating judge who cleared them of involvement in the affair, two low-level members of the BLTS arrested in 1998 remained in prison without due process. The GOH also failed to renew the appointment of the investigating judge.

In the Justice, Customs and Port Authority sectors, corruption remains a driving force. Although the rate of pay for judges was raised by 150% in 1999, bringing it to a level slightly higher than that of a policeman, judges' salaries remain sufficiently meager to make them vulnerable to bribes. Similarly, poorly paid Customs agents profit from widespread contraband activities in Haiti's ports. An estimated two-thirds of Haiti's imports arrive without the knowledge of or with the collusion of Haitian Customs.

Agreements and Treaties. Haiti is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, its 1972 protocol, and the 1988 UN Drug Convention. During 1999, as a result of government deadlock, the parliament failed to ratify the 1971 UN Drug Convention. In late 1999 in Paraguay, Haiti signed an affirmation of the 1998 Santiago Declaration in support of a CICAD-designed mechanism for multilateral evaluation of participating countries' counternarcotics efforts.

The GOH and the USG signed a six-part comprehensive maritime counternarcotics interdiction agreement in October of 1997. Although Haiti has still not taken the necessary parliamentary action to put the agreement in force due to its political stalemate, the GOH is implementing the provisions of this proposed agreement.

A 1904 bilateral extradition treaty between the USG and the GOH remains in force, but is not being utilized at this point because of the chaotic situation in Haiti. The 1987 Haitian constitution prohibits the extradition of Haitian nationals. In its FY 1999 Letter of Agreement with the United States, the GOH committed to act with diligence on all U.S. requests for deportation or expulsion to the U.S. of non-Haitian nationals wanted by the U.S. justice system. Further, the HNP permitted DEA to fingerprint all Colombians in Haitian prisons in an effort to check for those possibly wanted in the U.S. The USG did not request the expulsion to the U.S. of any non-Haitian nationals in 1999.

In 1997 the Haitian Foreign Ministry began review of an OAS Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) which, if ratified by the USG and GOH, would facilitate greater bilateral law enforcement cooperation. However, the GOH took no action on the proposed MLAT in 1998 or 1999.

IV. U.S Policy Initiatives and Programs

The plan of the U.S. Mission in Haiti for combating illegal drugs continues to be to reduce the amount of narcotics transiting Haiti while strengthening the capacity and operational effectiveness of the GOH institutions that oppose narcotics trafficking. This approach addresses both law enforcement entities and the justice sector, providing not only training, equipment, and infrastructure, but also operational support and mentoring. In addition, the strategy calls for U.S. efforts to foster interagency and international cooperation among GOH officials and to fight official corruption wherever possible.

In September of 1999, the USG and the GOH signed a Letter of Agreement under which the USG will provide USD 620,000 in FY 1999 counternarcotics assistance funds. The agreement covers projects to be mutually undertaken in the areas of law enforcement training, a Haitian-Dominican border counternarcotics initiative, the formation of a special investigative team to target major international traffickers, and anti-money laundering efforts.

USD 250,000 was obligated through INL in 1999 to assist Haiti in the aftermath of Hurricane Georges. The funds will be used to conduct an anti-corruption seminar in CY 2000.

The staff of the DEA's Port Au Prince Country Office, whose 1998 complement consisted of varying numbers of both permanent and temporary duty members, solidified in 1999 at eight permanent members. DEA divided the HNP's BLTS team into three distinct groups to address street, maritime, and airport endeavors and took leadership roles in both Operations Frontier Lance II and Columbus.

In 1999 U.S. Southern Command earmarked approximately USD 300,000 for infrastructure and training support to the HCG and was key in the execution of Operations Frontier Lance II and Columbus.

A U.S. Customs training and assistance project valued at $182,000, (from USAID FY 1998 funds), carried out five training missions for Haitian Customs and HNP during 1999, focusing on search procedures for seagoing vessels and aircraft. They also provided inspection tools and additional training equipment to Haitian Customs agents.

The Road Ahead. One of the United States' key national interests is stanching the flow of illegal narcotics transiting Haiti. The overall objectives of the U.S. Mission in Haiti in support of that interest are (1) improving the operational effectiveness of the GOH institutions that address illegal drugs; and (2) pursuing narcotics traffickers operating in Haiti in order to arrest, try and convict them either here or in the US. These objectives involve assisting the HNP to develop an effective narcotics interdiction capability while simultaneously working with it operationally to interdict narcotics traffickers. They also entail working to forge an effective counternarcotics team that will include Haitian Customs, Immigration, and Judiciary. To this end the USG will provide substantial training both inside and outside Haiti to the BLTS, the HCG, the JICC, and allied elements in the Judiciary, Customs, and Immigration.

Conceptually, the U.S. Mission intends to employ the "total package approach" which has been so successful with the

development of the HCG. This approach will involve coordinated interagency participation across a broad spectrum of areas including the development of infrastructure, the provision of equipment and training, and operational mentoring.

The U.S. Mission envisions Haiti as a square with one land and three maritime frontiers. Its efforts at interdiction on the western face of the square include creation of counternarcotics task forces lead by the BLTS at both the airport and seaport in Port au Prince, and development of the ship-boarding/search capability of the HCG operating from their Killick base near Port-au-Prince. In FY-2000 the U.S. Mission plans to repair the pier facility at Killick to facilitate further growth of the HCG. It intends to utilize a surplus U.S.military trailer to create an office for the BLTS at the seaport. It intends to use ICITAP and DEA assistance to fully integrate the JICC, which became active in 1999, into counternarcotics operations.

During FY 2000, the U.S. Mission in Haiti will construct a new HCG base at Cap Haitian on Haiti's northern coast. This base will include an operations center for the BLTS to facilitate its operations. The Prime Minister has given priority to enhancing the Haitian presence on Haiti's land border with the Dominican Republic by increasing the number of HNP officers there and deploying customs, immigration, and tax collection officers to the principal border crossing point at Malpasse. The U.S. Mission will support this initiative by assisting with the construction of an inspection point and a small-boat launching facility. U.S. Southern Command engineers already have done a preliminary site survey.

On the critical south coast, construction of a much-needed HCG facility in Jacmel has been unavoidably delayed by a major, ongoing reconstruction of the civilian port. Construction of the HCG base in Jacmel will not begin until FY01. As a substitute for the postponed Jacmel base, the U.S. Mission is pressing forward with the rehabilitation of an old Haitian naval base in Les Cayes. While not sealing Haiti's land and sea borders, these bases will establish an HCG presence on the south coast for the first time.

There is reason for guarded optimism that the GOH and USG can make progress during 2000. In 1999, for the first time, Haiti's Prime Minister took personal interest in the provisions of the Letter of Agreement governing counternarcotics funding by INL. He has directed that the HNP and Customs work together to counter narcotics trafficking, hopefully ending Custom's withdrawal, beginning in April 1999, from DEA's counternarcotics task forces at both the port and airport. Even with the support of the Prime Minister, however, counternarcotics efforts in Haiti will remain precarious. With both parliamentary and local elections set for March and presidential elections scheduled for November, there is considerable concern that the HNP will become politicized or corrupted to the point that counternarcotics operations may be compromised. Under those circumstances it could become impossible for the USG to continue working with the HNP. At present, Haiti's counternarcotics capability is rudimentary at best, but it is improving in response to USG assistance. Unfortunately, at the same time narcotics-related corruption within the GOH and civil society is growing. There are indications that narcotics use is spreading within Haitian society as a consequence of increased trafficking activity. Haiti is therefore engaged in a race against time to see whether the ability of the GOH to combat narcotics trafficking can outstrip its corrosive effects on Haitian society.

Haiti Statistics

(1991-1999)